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Abstract: During most of the 19th century, the UK was the primary driver of economic 
globalisation in Brazil. In the early 20th century, the US surpassed the British as Brazil’s main 
economic partner. Since 2009, China has become Brazil’s most important trade partner. 
Nowadays, Washington pushes for deglobalisation, while Beijing paves the way to reinforce 
globalisation. Accordingly, the global interconnection of the Brazilian economy increasingly 
depends on China. This article analyses how China is globalising the Brazilian economy, 
comparing this case with how the UK and the US did it in the past. The analysis considers 
indicators on trade and investment patterns. Both globalisation theory and the new theory of 
globalisers guide this study.  
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Introduction 
During most of the 19th century, the United Kingdom (UK) was the primary driver of economic 
globalisation in Brazil. In the early 20th century, the United States of America (US) surpassed 
the British as Brazil’s main economic partner. Since 2009, China has become Brazil’s most 
important trade partner. Under the Trump presidency, Washington has been pushing for 
deglobalisation, while Beijing is paving the way to reinforce globalisation. In this context, the 
global interconnection of the Brazilian economy increasingly depends on China. 
How is China different from the UK and the US? Each economic globaliser 
implemented a globalisation policy that moulded the choices each country had in the face of 
increasing global transformations. This article analyses how China is globalising the Brazilian 
economy, comparing this case with how the UK and the US did it in the past. Contemporary 
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literature and data inform the direct answers, assuming historical comparison is useful to 
understand the way China globalises Brazil.  
There are four main findings in this analysis. First, China is about to become the central 
vector of economic globalisation in Brazil. Second, Brazil-China bilateral trade and investment 
patterns resembled Brazil-UK relations in the 19th century. Third, transnational corporations 
(TNCs) from developed economies in China strongly affect the Brazil-China trade matrix. 
Finally, political negotiations between Beijing and Brasilia influence the prospect of Chinese 
investments in infrastructure and manufacturing in Brazil. 
Both globalisation theory and the new theory of globalisers guide this study. 
Globalisation and the rise of China should remain at the core of the research agenda in 
International Relations, since they are complex phenomena that entail drastic changes in 
societies all over the world and international politics. In a globalising world, managing the 
asymmetries between interdependent actors is a source of power (Keohane & Nye, 2001). 
Correspondingly, comparing different phases of globalisation and forms of globalising unveils 
the political alternatives of each country when engaging with globalisers. Managing the costs 
and benefits of globalising an economy depends on how the country interacts with economic 
globalisers, such as China. In this sense, this article hopefully inspires more studies on how 
China globalises other parts of the world.  
Numerous studies discuss when and how economic globalisation started and changed 
(see Arrighi, 1996; Spero & Hart, 1997; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999; Robertson, 
2003; Hobsbawm, 2006; Ghemawat, 2012). Some assumptions are required to avoid endless 
discussions in this regard. This article refers to widely known historical references to compare 
three moments of globalisation: from 1870 to 1914,2 when the UK prevailed; from 1970 to 
2000,3 when the US led the process; and the current moment, featuring the rise of China and 
the post-American world (Zakaria, 2008; Ghemawat, 2012; Martin, 2012; Bremmer, 2013). 
The cross-temporal comparisons consider three bilateral relations: Brazil-UK in the first 
phase of economic globalisation, Brazil-US in the second phase, and Brazil-China at the current 
moment. The reason for comparing British, American, and Chinese economic relations with 
Brazil lies in the fact that the UK and the US were the main economic globalisers in those 
moments, while China seems about to become one in a few years. A set of indicators concerning 
economic globalisation allows such a historical comparison. The indicators refer to the volume 
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of capital and trade flows, the geographical distribution (origin/destination) of such flows, and 
their sectorial distribution.  
The first section presents the assumptions and theoretical framework that allows an 
assessment of the power of countries over globalisation and the leaders of this process. The 
second section highlights the distinctive status of China in the context of economic globalisation 
compared to Brazil. It also analyses the asymmetries in the bilateral relations. The third and 
fourth sections respectively present a summary of how the UK led the globalisation of the 
Brazilian economy during the 19th century, and how the US did it in the 20th century. The final 
section develops the comparative analysis and shows that China is about to become the central 
reference of globalisation for the Brazilian economy. 
 
Applying globalisation theory and the theory of globalisers  
Economic globalisation (as in other dimensions of the process) does not happen anonymously 
or spontaneously. A few countries are decisive to “globalise” the least integrated economies. 
For example, in the late 19th century, the UK, Germany, France, and the US were decisive in 
carrying globalisation into both Brazil and China. The UK had a leading role in promoting the 
economic integration of most countries, which the US performed from the end of the Second 
World War. Recently, has China become the leading globaliser? To answer this question, one 
must consider looking at it from another perspective: the one from the countries that embrace 
globalisation and hence become globalised.  
In the late 19th century, where would Brazil or China get the products that symbolised 
technological progress? Without the capital or technology to produce locomotives, telegraphs, 
industrial machines, or electric generators, where would Brazilian and Chinese families, 
businesses, and governments acquire them? To what countries should they export their output 
in exchange for those goods? The UK, Germany, France, the US, and no more than five other 
countries would have been the references for both the Brazilians and the Chinese.  
Each historical moment had a small set of countries as references of economic 
globalisation. In the 20th century, there would be no “global economy” as we know it without 
the members of the G7 (the political association of the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, 
Italy, and Canada). They were major markets and providers of capital, goods, services, and 
technologies. Thus, they were decisive in expanding the scale, scope, speed, and impact of 
intercontinental business networks and economic flows. 
Acknowledging such a perspective and implicit indicators of global interconnection, 
this article assumes globalisation is 
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a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organisation of social relations and transactions – assessed regarding their extensity, 
intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and 
networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt 
& Perraton, 2003: 68). 
 
The economic dimension – commerce, finance, and production – is implicit in the broad 
terms of ‘social relations and transactions’. Both trade and financial globalisation imply the 
increase in extensity, velocity, intensity, and impact of businesses, whereas productive 
globalisation refers to global production networks and corporate strategies, as well as the 
industrial and technical prowess of countries (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999). 
Although globalisation is not merely an economic process, this article discusses only the 
economic dimension due to necessary analytic delimitation. 
The theory of globalisation (see Albrow & King, 1990; Giddens, 2003; Held, McGrew, 
Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999; Hirst & Thompson, 1998; Keohane & Nye, 2001; Robertson, 1992; 
Santos, 2006; Stiglitz, 2002; Volberda et al, 2011) usually does not pay enough attention to the 
political actors leading the process. For this reason, I introduced the concept of globaliser 
(Magalhaes, 2011).  
 
Globalisers are the leaders (vectors, poles, architects) of globalisation […] the countries 
that most affect the increase or decrease of globalism and shape its characteristics – the 
particularities of networks and the velocity, intensity, direction and impact of global 
flows (social, cultural, military, environmental etc.) […] Globaliser countries are those 
who contribute the most to determine the characteristics of one dimension of 
globalisation in a given period (Magalhaes, 2015: 69, translated). 
 
Through this perspective, to globalise is to thrust and steer flows and networks towards 
another continent actively. Globalisers are the actors this process. Conversely, globalising 
countries are the ones becoming increasingly open to such transcontinental flows and 
networks.4 In the economic dimension, globalising countries regard globalisers as their main 
references for market access, capital, and technology. 
Each globaliser adopts a particular approach towards globalisation to reshape and 
benefit more from it. This approach is a globalisation policy: the set of actions and decisions 
that engenders distributive and organisational changes in a dimension of globalisation. 
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Economic globalisation policy refers to how a country develops international economic 
relations.  
Global projection indicators allow the identification of globalisers. Accordingly, 
economic globalisers account for shares of foreign trade and exports of high technology goods 
and services on a global scale. They are significant trade and investment partners for a large 
number of distant countries. They lead the supply of credit and portfolio investments. They host 
large TNCs (including financial corporations). They control the largest foreign direct 
investment (FDI) stocks in a large number of distant countries. Finally, they are leading holders 
and generators of patents. 
Two indicators measure economic openness (or the level of globalisation) (Ghemawat, 
2012; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999; Hirst & Thompson, 1998; Krugman & 
Obstfeld, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002; Babones, 2007). The first is the ratio of total international trade 
(exports and imports) to the gross domestic product (GDP); in other words, how much of 
internal production and consumption entail external transactions. The second is the proportion 
of FDI stock in relation to the GDP, which refers to the participation of foreign capital in a 
country’s output. In this context, economic globalisers are important business partners for many 
distant countries, accounting for a substantial part of these countries’ international trade and 
FDI stock. 
 
Asymmetric South-South relations: China is a globaliser, and Brazil is more dependent 
Developing economies, emerging markets, and the Global South are expressions that underline 
the similarities of countries outside the developed world. Relations between such countries are 
usually referred to as South-South cooperation, for instance, the partnership between the BRICS 
countries (the political association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). However, 
recent studies have been unveiling asymmetric bilateral relations within the Global South 
(CEPAL, 2010; Phillips, 2010; Zweig, 2010; Xing, 2016; Callahan, 2016). This is especially 
true in countries where China is the main link to economic globalisation.  
Six global economic projection indicators prove that China’s status in the context of 
economic globalisation is incomparably higher than Brazil, which is rather distant from 
becoming a globaliser. First, China (mainland only)5 is the largest exporter and the second 
largest importer in the world, accounting respectively for 13% of global exports and 10% of 
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global imports in 2016, while Brazil is in distant 25th and 30th places respectively, with 1% of 
global exports and 1% of global imports (UNCTAD, 2017a). Furthermore, China is the largest 
provider of high-tech goods (technology intensive merchandise that requires high-skilled 
labour), accounting for 16% of global exports in the sector in 2016, while Brazil provided just 
0,4% (UNCTAD, 2017a). 
Second, China is a central economic partner for several countries outside its region. 
Such inference derives from the fact that the country is the largest extra-regional importer of 
Africa, America, and Oceania, and the second biggest buyer of European exports (UNCTAD, 
2017a). Contrastingly, Brazil is not amongst the top five extra-regional importers of any 
continent (UNCTAD, 2017a). Therefore, China’s thrust to trade flows and networks in other 
countries is much stronger. 
Third, neither Brazil nor China stand up as major holders of portfolio investment assets 
abroad. However, since data in this regard is misleading,6 other factors must be taken in to 
account to avoid underestimating China’s actual role in international financial transactions. In 
2015, China managed more than ten times more worldwide portfolio investment assets than 
Brazil, and Hong Kong (a Chinese special economic zone) was amongst the top ten primary 
holders of such assets (IMF, 2017).  
Fourth, there are four Chinese TNCs (including one from Hong Kong and another from 
Taiwan) amongst the world’s top 100 with the largest amount of foreign assets, while just one 
Brazilian TNC is on the list (UNCTAD, 2017b). Amongst the largest TNCs from developing 
countries, 38 Chinese TNCs (including 14 from Hong Kong and six from Taiwan) and six 
Brazilians (UNCTAD, 2017b). Therefore, the ethnic Chinese play a stronger role in 
international production networks.  
Fifth, the same conclusion derives from data regarding the control over FDI stocks. 
Nearly 5% of worldwide FDI stocks in 2016 were from mainland China and another 6% from 
Hong Kong (idem), while less than 1% originated from Brazil (UNCTAD, 2017a). 
                                                          
6 Most nations fail to transparently register all inward and outward capital flows (Cunha & Acioly, 
2009; Macedo & Spinola, 2015; CNI, 2017). The World Bank (2017), IMF (2017) and UNCTAD 
(2017) often provide different figures on the subject. Capital flows from one country to another 
frequently pass through intermediary countries, such as the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong 
(China), and Luxembourg, hence problems of double counting. Such triangular flows conceal the 
actual origin of the capital. For example, many countries register investments received from Hong 
Kong or Luxembourg, but that money is actually Brazilian or Chinese that went elsewhere before 
reaching its final destination. Furthermore, data on Chinese investments is underestimated if just 
“mainland China” is considered. On the other hand, a serious problem of double counting would 
appear if such data was summed with data on Chinese special areas, such as Hong Kong and Macau. 
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Finally, China has also more available technical and industrial expertise to produce the 
contemporary symbols of technological progress. The country is the third largest holder of 
patents in force and the one that requests the most licenses per year (WIPO, 2017). The Chinese 
hold more than ten times the number of Brazilian patents in force (WIPO, 2017). 
An additional point differentiates not only the emerging countries themselves, but also 
the supposedly South-South relations they develop. That is: China is more important to Brazil 
than Brazil is to China, at least when considering investments, trade, and technology. China 
accounted for 2.3% of FDI stocks in Brazil in 2014, and 17% of Brazilian trade (imports plus 
exports), while the corresponding Brazilian share in China’s business are 0.02% and 1.6% 
(China, 2017; CNI, 2017). Moreover, in 2016, China supplied 40% of all high-tech imports in 
Brazil, while Brazil made just 0,15% of all high-tech imports in China (UNCTAD, 2017a). 
 All in all, the indicators prove that China is amongst the countries with the greatest 
power over globalisation, presumably, alongside with the US, Japan, and Germany. These 
countries are economic globalisers and, thus, capable of actively changing globalisation itself 
and the risks and opportunities it conveys. In contrast, Brazil has limited power over economic 
globalisation and, thus, faces a different set of risks and opportunities. Accordingly, the costs 
and benefits of globalising the Brazilian economy depend more on the country’s relations with 
the economic globalisers, such as China.  
   
The UK in Brazil during the first golden age of globalisation (1870-1914) 
In the late 19th century, the UK, along with the US and a handful of developed European 
economies, led the innovation in transportation (i.e. railways, steamships, and automobiles), 
communication (i.e. telegraph and telephones), energy (i.e. turbines and electricity), industry 
(i.e. steel and machines), agriculture (i.e. fertilisers and tools), and mining (i.e. coal and iron 
ore). They were economic globalisers, given their weight in international trade and capital 
flows.  
The UK was the central locomotive of economic globalisation, and a primary reference 
for globalising countries that aspired to modernisation, economic growth, and industrialisation. 
The British were the main traders, investors, and creditors for most of the world, as well as 
major providers of the technical infrastructure required by any globalising country, such as 
railways, electricity, and other symbols of technological progress. The British accounted for 
22% of world exports in 1870 and 15% in 1913 (Maddison, 2001). In 1914, they provided 44% 
of all international investment in the world, most of which was for railways and public utility 
projects (Abreu, 2000; Hobsbawm, 2006).  
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Portugal introduced economic globalisation to Brazil within a colonial framework that 
lasted about 300 years. After the independence of Brazil, Portugal, as its first globaliser stepped 
down, being replaced by the British. Virtually all foreign investment in Brazil until 1895 came 
from the UK and, by 1913, this percentage was about 65% (Leslie, 1989; Philip, 1989; Abreu, 
2000; Almeida, 2001; Curado & Cruz, 2008). More than 80% of this capital financed 
infrastructure: from 1870 to 1913, British capital and technology were crucial to building 
railways (more than 20,000 kilometres), telegraph services, electric distribution systems 
(Leslie, 1989; Philip, 1989; Abreu, 2000; Almeida, 2001; Summerhill, 2005). As an example, 
both British capital and technology integrated the Brazilian Traction, Light and Power 
Company, a Canadian firm that built the biggest hydropower facility in Brazil in 1906 in Rio 
de Janeiro and operated tramway cars in Sao Paulo (Abreu, 2000; Light, 2006; Fausto, 2007). 
British firms financed most of the export-import-transport-insurance complex in Brazil 
and indirectly played a central role in the country’s nascent industry, which employed nearly 
14% of Brazilian workforce in 1920 (Abreu, 2000; Fausto & Devoto, 2004; Fausto, 2007; Cervo 
& Bueno, 2010). Commerce, shipping, banking and other intermediation activities gave support 
to industrial growth in Brazil. However, concerning the industrial sector, British investments in 
Brazil (i.e. shoes, matches, and textiles) were relatively small when compared to those of North 
Americans and other Europeans (Abreu, 2000; Curado & Cruz, 2008). In the 1920s, the British 
stock of FDI in Brazil was twice as the American, but since then the US has become the largest 
source of FDI influx. 
In the 1870s, the British provided nearly 54% of Brazilian imports and absorbed about 
40% of Brazilian exports, but thenceforth their share fell to about one-fifth of total Brazilian 
foreign trade (imports plus exports) by 1901 (Brasil, 1990). The US replaced the UK as Brazil’s 
most important trade partner between 1880 and 1890 (Brasil, 1990; Abreu, 2000; Cervo & 
Bueno, 2010). Regarding the bilateral trade matrix around the year 1900, Brazil provided 
cotton, leather, sugar, and rubber to the UK, and acquired symbols of progress (i.e. machinery 
and telegraph equipment) and other manufactured goods, mainly textiles (Leslie, 1989; Philip, 
1989; Fausto, 2007; Cervo & Bueno, 2010). 
In sum, three features of the British way of globalising Brazil between 1870 and 1914 
are useful to develop the next sections of this article. First, the focus of British investments were 
less on industry and more on transport and communication infrastructure such as railways and, 
to a lesser extent, electrification, telegraph, urban trains, and other public utilities. Second, they 
also prompted private business in Brazil – agriculture, industry, and mining – because of 
intermediation activities related to commerce, shipping, and banking. Third, the bilateral trade 
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matrix perfectly illustrated the centre-periphery (or North-South) model in which the developed 
economies sell manufactured goods to the periphery in exchange for raw material.  
 
The US in Brazil during the second golden age of globalisation (1970-2000) 
In the late 20th century, the G7 were the largest and most industrialised economies in the world, 
and they gave birth to most Nobel Prize winners in technical fields (Hobsbawm, 1995). Aside 
from leading innovation in transportation (i.e. modern and faster trains, ships, automobiles, and 
airplanes), communication (i.e. computers, cell phones, and satellites), energy (i.e. fuel and 
nuclear energy), industry (i.e. healthcare and robotics), agriculture (i.e. fertilisers and tools), 
and mining (i.e. modern mining trucks and drills), they accounted for most of the international 
trade and capital flows.  
The US became the first and undisputed economic globaliser in the 1940s. In the 
following decades, it became the primary reference for globalising countries, just as the British 
were during most of the 19th century. The American share of total global trade oscillated from 
17% in 1948 to 13% in 1970, and once more to 16% in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2017a). The US had 
the leading position as a global trader during most of the 20th century, despite oscillation caused 
mainly by the increasing participation of the other G7 countries in global trade. The Americans 
provided more than half of the world’s FDI flows between the 1950s and 1970s (Castells, 2003; 
UNCTAD, 2017a). In 1986, the US share of the world’s FDI stocks reached its peak, 46%, but 
by 2000 it declined to 36% (UNCTAD, 2017a). Most of the US FDI is for business supporting 
activities, such as management, accounting, and advertising, but a substantial part is directly 
related to manufacturing activities, mostly transportation, telecommunication, chemicals, and 
food products (OECD, 2017a, 2017b).  
When examining the accumulated FDI stock in Brazil by 1950, the US and Canada had 
nearly 29% each, followed by the British with 11% (Curado & Cruz, 2008). In 1979, the US 
accounted for 28% of that stock, far from the Germans, who were the second largest investors 
in Brazil, with 15% (Curado & Cruz, 2008). By 2003, American FDI stock accounted for 23% 
of all FDI stock in Brazil (OECD, 2017a, 2017b).  
American TNCs gave a decisive thrust to the process of heavy industrialisation in Brazil 
from 1955 to 1980 (Curado & Cruz, 2008). Indeed, in the 1970s, industrial investments featured 
about three-quarters of all American FDI in Brazil (Curado & Cruz, 2008). For example, the 
automotive industry accounted for 11%, mostly Ford and General Motors plants in Sao Paulo 
(Curado & Cruz, 2008; Fausto, 2007). Other industrial investments were relatively diversified 
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and included chemical and mechanic industries, metallurgy, and electronic and communication 
material (Curado & Cruz, 2008; Fausto, 2007).  
In the second half of the 20th century, the US share in overall Brazilian foreign trade 
(imports plus exports) oscillated between a third and a quarter (Brasil, 1990; UNCTAD, 2017a). 
Almost all Brazilian imports from the US were manufactured goods, accounting for 92% in 
2000 (UNCTAD, 2017a). Unlike the UK in 1900, the share of manufacturing goods that the 
US bought from Brazil has been considerable since the 1970s, oscillating around 70% of 
Brazilian sales to the North Americans until 2016 (UNCTAD, 2017a). 
Three features distinguish the way the US globalised Brazil between 1970 and 2000 
from the British style in the past. First, North American investments focused on industry, and 
not on infrastructure. Their industries were more competitive than the British and resorted to 
modern internationalisation strategies to face the growing European competition (Abreu, 2000; 
Curado & Cruz, 2008). Besides, Brazil lifted heavy restrictions to foreigners in other sectors – 
such as infrastructure and mining – and allowed foreign investors access to abundant raw 
material, a large and dynamic domestic market, fiscal incentives, and protection from external 
competition (Fausto, 2007; Cervo & Bueno, 2010). 
Second, just as the British did in the 19th century, the US had (and still has) a central 
role in business intermediation activities and foreign trade in Brazil. The distinguishing feature 
now is how large TNCs increasingly fragment, displace, and organise their activities within 
global value chains (GVCs) to benefit from the comparative advantages of each country.  GVCs 
entail intra-industry and intra-company trade, transnational production networks, exports, 
added value trade, and re-exports (OECD, WTO & World Bank 2014; UNCTAD 2013). As a 
result, Brazil and other nations involved in GVCs import and export larger quantities of 
manufactured parts and components, such as American TNCs in Brazil trading vehicles and 
auto parts. 
Third, the bilateral trade matrix diverged from the North-South model, since 
manufactured goods represented a significant share of Brazilian exports to North America. 
Actually, instead of the traditional international division of labour, globalising Brazil under US 
leadership meant industrialisation and involvement in GVCs. 
Considering these distinctive features, sceptics might argue that the UK style of leading 
globalisation was different from the US because of the diverse historical contexts. They would 
underline the differences related to technical changes: the Second Industrial Revolution and the 
advent of new industries, as well as the Information Technology Revolution and new hardware 
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and software sectors. If they were right, it would be pointless to compare the presence of the 
UK, the US, and China in the Brazilian economy during different historical moments.   
There are several limitations in this argument. First, the UK and the US had different 
approaches towards globalisation in the 19th and 20th centuries, thus reflecting each country’s 
deliberate choice and not an unavoidable path derived from technical change. Each globaliser 
has its particular style derived from its interests. Second, globalising countries, including Brazil, 
are also capable of politically shaping their interactions with globalisers, for example, 
forbidding foreign capital in national infrastructure. Therefore, the distinctions between the 
economic presence of the UK and the US in Brazil was partly defined by Brasilia. Third, the 
way China globalises is less determined by contemporary technical constraints, and more by 
Beijing's globalisation policy, as discussed in the next section.  
 
How China globalises Brazil: UK style, foreign firms, nascent GVCs, and politics 
In the first decades of the present century, China joined the group of economic globalisers. As 
mentioned before, data on innovation trends are sufficient to assure China’s leading role in 
technology, notwithstanding the obvious impossibility of predicting what country will host the 
next technical revolution in what sector.  
As the world’s largest exporter since 2009 and second largest importer, China has a 
huge weight in international trade. While the American share in total global trade went from 
16% from in 2000 to 7% in 2016, the Asian dragon’s share went from 4% to 13% (UNCTAD, 
2017a). The contemporary “world’s factory” accounted for 19% of the world’s manufactured 
exports and 17% of high-tech exports in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2017a). 
The Asian giant significantly contributed to increasing both global trade and Brazilian 
foreign trade. World exports went from US$6.4 trillion to US$16 trillion in that same period, 
whereas 19% of the additional trade involved China (UNCTAD, 2017a). Brazilian exports went 
from US$55 billion to US$185 billion, and China’s soaring imports accounted for 26% of the 
difference (UNCTAD, 2017a). Regarding FDI outflows, the Chinese contribution was less 
impressive, accounting for 5% of all the global FDI flows between 2000 and 2016 (UNCTAD, 
2017a). Nevertheless, the Chinese annual share of global FDI outflows remained around 1% 
until 2007. Then it swiftly rose to 13% by 2016, so the most recent trends favour China 
(UNCTAD, 2017a). 
In this context, globalising countries currently see China as one of the prominent sources 
of FDI flows. From 2000 to 2016, the Chinese share of FDI stocks in the world went from 0.1% 
to 5%, and Beijing’s globalisation policy seems determined to keep pace with this recent trend 
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(China Daily 2008; Santos & Milan 2014; Pautasso & Ungaretti, 2017; CNI, 2017). Beijing has 
been actively promoting investments in energy and electricity, which account for 41% of 
Chinese FDI stocks in the world by 2015, followed by other relevant sectors, such as metals 
(mining and steel industry, 17%) and real estate (10%) (CNI, 2017). Between 2005 and 2015, 
the US was the primary destination of Chinese FDI flows, absorbing 14%, followed by 
Australia (11%), Canada (6%), and Brazil (5%) (CNI, 2017).  
China became the 13th country with the largest FDI stocks in Brazil in 2014, reaching 
2.3% of all FDI stocks in the country (CNI, 2017). China’s presence in Brazil will increase even 
more, given the Chinese interests in market access and raw material (CEPAL, 2010; Zweig, 
2010; Lucena & Bennett, 2013; Macedo & Spinola, 2015; CNI, 2017). In 2015, 69% of the 
Chinese FDI in Brazil were in energy and electricity, while the metal and steel sectors absorbed 
11%, and financial services received 5%, as did agriculture (CNI, 2017). Sinopec and Sinochem 
(Chinese oil and chemical TNCs), which control massive investments in the oil sector 
worldwide, illustrate Beijing’s “resource diplomacy”, notwithstanding recent announcements 
about considerable investments in automotive, technology, telecommunications, and electronic 
industries (Zweig, 2010; IPEA, 2011; Lucena & Bennett, 2013; Macedo & Spinola, 2015; 
Bernal-Meza, 2016; Li, 2016; CNI, 2017).  
Backed by the BRICS and a strong history of partnership since the 1970s, the close 
diplomatic relations between Brasilia and Beijing allowed the Chinese to negotiate investments 
in strategic and highly regulated sectors in Brazil, such as transportation, communication, and 
energy (Oliveira, 2006; Becard, 2008; Cervo & Bueno, 2010). Accordingly, nowadays, the 
Brazilians have been expecting Chinese investments in railways, internet cables, and power 
generation (Lucena & Bennett, 2013; Brasil, 2015; Lima, 2016; Li, 2016; CNI, 2017; Maele, 
2017; Pereira & Scaramuzzo, 2017; Lee, 2017). The political and economic crises in Brazil 
since 2014, along with slow growth and uncertainty, have also been affecting Chinese 
investment decisions. 
The case of the automotive sector illustrated such uncertainty. Brazil implemented 
INOVAR AUTO from 2013 to 2017 to attract investments, affecting the original Chinese 
investment plans (Macedo & Spinola, 2015; CNI, 2017). INOVAR AUTO raised taxes on 
automakers that did not meet its requirements, such as producing most of the vehicle’s parts 
and components in Brazil (G1, 2017). The World Trade Organisation deemed this policy for 
encouraging national content in manufacturing activities discriminatory and condemned Brazil, 
which is currently changing the rules of the game once more (Agencia Estado, 2017). Despite 
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the uncertain perspective for Chinese factories in Brazil, vehicle-related trade between both 
countries is soaring.  
The Asian dragon surpassed the US as Brazil’s most important trade partner in 2009, 
accounting for 17% of Brazilian trade (imports plus exports) in 2016, when Brazil-US trade 
made 16% (UNCTAD, 2017a). The Brazilian export matrix to China is hugely concentrated. 
Soya beans accounted for nearly 41% of Brazilian exports to China, followed by iron ore (21%), 
and oil (11%) (UNCTAD, 2017a). Roughly 96% of the Brazilian imports from China were 
manufactured goods, whereas 33% of such imports were high-tech goods (i.e. 
telecommunication equipment, optical instruments, and electrical machinery), making China 
the supplier of 40% of all Brazilian high-tech imports (UNCTAD, 2017a). Thus, Brazil acquires 
smartphones and other contemporary symbols of progress from China, just like it bought 
telegraph equipment from the British more than a hundred years ago. 
Overall, the Chinese way of globalising Brazil in the 21st century is closer to that of the 
UK than the US. First, like British investments in the 19th century, the Chinese also focus less 
on industry and more on infrastructure and mining. Second, the Chinese also prompted business 
in Brazil, not directly or through intermediation activities, but rather through partnerships with 
both private and state-owned companies in sectors in which Brazil regulates foreign capital, 
such as railways, oil extraction, and mining. Third, the current Brazil-China trade matrix 
reflects typical centre-periphery relations, instead of “South-South”.  
Within the scope of this article and its indicators, what distinguishes the Chinese from 
the British way of globalising is that China incorporates and reinforces a core characteristic of 
the US-led globalisation, which is the central role of TNCs and GVCs. In this sense, Beijing’s 
globalisation policy acknowledges the role of foreign TNCs behind China’s foreign trade and 
promotes the nascent Chinese GVCs.  
Most of the largest TNCs have subsidiaries in both Brazil and China. Accordingly, 
TNCs from the US and other G7 countries, through their GVCs, play a central role in Brazil-
China trade and investment relations. Foreign TNCs in China account for a major – although 
decreasing – share of the country’s foreign trade: 48% of all exports from China in 2000 and 
44% in 2015, and 52% of China’s imports in 2000 and 49% in 2015 (China, 2017). The share 
of foreign TNCs in China’s high-tech exports might have reached 85% in 2003 (Dittmer, 2010). 
Therefore, a large portion of China’s foreign trade is not “Chinese exports” or “Chinese 
imports”, because it is managed by foreigners, not by ethnic Chinese using their capital and 
technology.  
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China became a huge production hub, mostly by importing high-tech goods, adding low 
valuable parts and components, and re-exporting the final product (Cunha & Acioly, 2009; 
UNCTAD, 2013; Zweig, 2010; Dittmer, 2010; Sawaya, 2011; OECD, 2013). However, Beijing 
promoted Chinese ownership by co-opting foreign capital and merging companies to modernise 
and industrialise the economy, so Chinese TNCs absorbed foreign capital and technology 
through joint ventures and reverse engineering (Cunha & Acioly, 2009; Hout & Ghemawat, 
2010; IEDI, 2011; Oliveira, 2011; Sawaya, 2011). As a result, nowadays, Chinese TNCs are 
increasingly developing their technology, producing high-tech goods, and organising their 
GVCs (IEDI, 2011; Sawaya, 2011; Oliveira, 2011). 
In this context, either Brazil remains just a provider of primary goods and low 
technology manufacturing for the “world’s factory”, or Brasilia reasserts its relations with 
China and encourages Chinese industrial investments (Cunha, Bichara, Monsueto & Lélis, 
2011). The nascent Chinese GVCs that recently announced industrial investments in Brazil 
could attenuate the mentioned asymmetry in the bilateral trade matrix (Lucena & Bennett, 2013; 
Li, 2016; CNI, 2017). Such a change is unlikely without any political negotiation, because 
market forces alone might follow the current Revealed Comparative Advantages on both sides, 
whereas China outdoes Brazil in every sector except for primary goods and natural resources 
(Cunha, Bichara, Monsueto & Lélis, 2011). 
The final feature that distinguishes the China-led globalisation is the central role of 
politics and public capital. Beijing’s globalisation policy was vital for transforming China into 
a modern and globalised economy and, in the present century, it is decisive to guide China’s 
economic projection (Santos & Milan, 2014). The reassertion of political interests through 
public capital and state-owned TNCs is a Chinese characteristic of contemporary economic 
globalisation. Political considerations behind private, state-owned or combined projects define 
the Chinese economic projection through infrastructure investments and manufacturing GVCs 
(Lucena & Bennett, 2013; Santos & Milan, 2014).  
 
Conclusion 
China is about to become the primary driver of economic globalisation in Brazil if current trends 
persist. Accordingly, the pace at which the Brazilian economy opens, the volume of economic 
transactions, the extent of Brazilian business networks, and the impacts of economic 
globalisation on the country increasingly depend on Beijing’s globalisation policy and the 
specific compromises between Beijing and Brasilia. Notwithstanding their common profile as 
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emerging countries from the Global South and their shared political interests as members of the 
BRICS, there is a considerable economic asymmetry between them.  
From a Brazilian point of view, the Chinese globalisation policy in the first decades of 
the 21st century meant investments in extracting natural resources and expanding agriculture, 
disappointing investments in infrastructure and industry, concentration in non-manufactured 
exports, and swelling manufactured imports. In this sense, China’s economic presence in Brazil 
currently resembles the UK’s in the 19th century in both weight and style. It contrasts with how 
the US globalised Brazil.  
While the US in the 20th century heavily invested in the manufacturing sector in Brazil, 
the Chinese – like the British in the 1800s – recently concentrated in infrastructure and natural 
resources. Brazil’s foreign trade is becoming similar to how it was in 1900, when it provided 
primary goods to its main economic globaliser, the UK, and acquired the symbols of progress 
and other manufactured goods. Contrastingly, Brazil-US trade patterns for the past five decades 
have been more balanced, involving GVCs and intra-industry trade. Nevertheless, there are 
more channels through which the US and other developed economies continue to globalise 
Brazil.  
China’s weight in the Brazilian economy is huge and increasing, so it is likely that 
Brazilians might start to equate economic globalisation to the Chinese presence in the country 
instead of that of the US. However, the US and other G7 economic globalisers host most of the 
foreign TNCs that account for a major share of China’s exports. China is deeply involved in 
GVCs, buying parts and components, and selling the final product. A substantial portion of 
Brazilian exports to China supply the subsidiaries of those TNCs, which in turn provide 
manufactured goods to Brazil that are not completely “made in China”. In this sense, instead of 
“replacing” the US, China’s economic presence in Brazil partly reinforces the role of the G7 as 
economic globalisers in Brazil.  
Nevertheless, TNCs from developed countries are not the only ones building GVCs. 
Relatively new and already large Chinese TNCs have been doing the same in several countries, 
mostly in East Asia. It is possible that China, like the US did, will involve Brazil in GVCs and 
intra-industry trade, which would meet the Brazilian interest in promoting industrial growth. 
This possibility relates to the distinctive feature of China-led globalisation, which is the central 
role of politics and public capital, whereas Beijing's globalisation policy steers trade and 
investment flows. Thus, China’s strategic partners, such as the BRICS countries, have better 
conditions for dialogue and cooperation to address economic asymmetries. In this context, 
negotiations with Brasilia might define the prospect of the Chinese infrastructure projects and 
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manufacturing GVCs in Brazil. As talks between the countries regularly address these issues, 
Brasilia can effectively negotiate a mutual development project and a more balanced 
partnership with Beijing. Whether this happens or not is a subject for other studies. 
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